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The prospects for a revival of nuclear power were dim even before the partial reactor meltdowns at
the Fukushima nuclear plant. Nuclear power has long been controversial because of concerns about
nuclear accidents, proliferation risk, and the storage of spent fuel. These concerns are real and important.
In addition, however, a key challenge for nuclear power has been the high cost of construction for
nuclear plants. Construction costs are high enough that it becomes difficult to make an economic argument
for nuclear, even before incorporating these external costs. This is particularly true in countries like
the United States where recent technological advances have dramatically increased the availability
of natural gas.
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In September 2007 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) received a license 
application for a proposed nuclear power reactor to be built in Southern Texas. The application was 
significant because it marked the first new license application in almost three decades. During the 
following year the NRC went on to receive 16 license applications for a total of 24 proposed reactors. 
The time was right, so it seemed, for a nuclear power renaissance in the United States. Natural gas 
prices were at their highest level ever in real terms. The 2005 Energy Policy Act provided loan 
guarantees, production tax credits, and other subsidies for new nuclear plants.  And many believed 
that the United States was close to enacting legislation that would limit emissions of carbon 
dioxide. 
Then everything changed. Natural gas prices fell sharply in 2009. Legislation to limit 
carbon emissions stalled in Congress. The global recession slowed the growth of electricity 
demand. And, in March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami knocked out power at the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Plant in northern Japan, causing partial meltdowns at the plant’s three active 
reactors and large-scale releases of radioactive steam. Since 2009 only a single additional license 
application has been filed with the NRC. The project proposed for Southern Texas has been 
cancelled and few of the applications pending with the NRC are moving forward. Fukushima has 
had perhaps an even stronger impact worldwide leading Germany, Switzerland, and Italy to 
announce plans to phase out their nuclear power programs and causing China to suspend approvals 
for new reactors. 
Nuclear power has long been controversial because of concerns about nuclear accidents, 
storage of spent fuel, and about how the spread of nuclear power might raise risks of the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. These concerns are real and important. However, emphasizing these concerns 
implicitly suggests that unless these issues are taken into account, nuclear power would 
otherwise be cost-effective compared to other forms of electricity generation. This implication is 2 
 
unwarranted. Throughout the history of nuclear power, a key challenge has been the high cost of 
construction for nuclear plants. Construction costs are high enough that it becomes difficult to 
make an economic argument for nuclear, even before incorporating these external factors. This is 
particularly true in countries like the United States where recent technological advances have 
dramatically increased the availability of natural gas. 
The chairman of one of the largest U.S. nuclear companies recently said that his company 
would not break ground on a new nuclear plant until the price of natural gas was more than double 
today’s level and carbon emissions cost $25 per ton (Wald, 2010). This seems to pretty well 
summarize the current economics of nuclear power. Yes, there is a certain confluence of factors that 
could make nuclear power a viable economic option. Otherwise, it seems unlikely that there will 
be much of a renaissance. 
 
The First Boom and Bust 
This recent ebb and flow in the nuclear power sector recalls a much larger boom and bust that 
occurred starting in the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 1 plots U.S. nuclear power reactor orders from 
1950 to 2000. By 1974 there were 54 operating reactors in the United States with another 197 on 
order. This was a period of great enthusiasm for nuclear power. U.S. coal prices were at their 
highest level ever in real terms and utilities were forecasting robust growth in electricity demand 
into the distant future.
1 The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (1974) predicted that by the end of 
the twentieth century half of all U.S. electricity generation would come from nuclear power. 
Instead, reactor orders fell precipitously after 1974. Over the next several years not only 
were new reactors not being ordered, but utilities began suspending construction on existing 
orders. Less than half of the reactors on order in 1974 were ever completed. Much has been 
written about the problems that faced the nuclear industry during this period (see, for example, 
Joskow and Yellin, 1980; Joskow, 1982; McCallion, 1995). Part of the explanation is that 
concerns about safety and the environment began to take a more central role. In 1974, the NRC 
                                                           
1 For historic coal prices see U.S. Department of Energy (2011a), Table 7.9 “Coal Prices, 1949-2010”. Natural 
gas was much less important during the 1970s because modern combined cycle technology had not yet been widely 
introduced and because shortages associated with federal price controls on natural gas limited the availability of 
natural gas for electric generation. 
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was created to replace an organization called the Atomic Energy Commission that had been 
charged with both regulating and promoting nuclear power, a combination of duties which many 
viewed to be in direct conflict. This new organization was to oversee the safety and security of all 
aspects of nuclear power, including the initial licensing of reactors, the handling of radioactive 
materials, and the storage and disposal of spent fuels. Beginning in the 1970s it also became more 
difficult to site nuclear power plants. Communities began challenging nuclear power projects in 
federal and state courts, leading to extended construction delays and changing public attitudes 
about nuclear power. 
This was also a period of structural change for utility regulation. During the 1950s and 
1960s economies of scale, decreasing commodity costs, and relatively low inflation led to steady 
decreases in the nominal cost of electricity. Public utility commissions and consumers were 
pacified with prices that remained essentially the same in nominal terms year after year. Joskow 
(1974) explains that inflation in the early 1970s, “wreaked havoc on this process that appeared to 
function so smoothly before... and most major firms found that they had to raise prices (some for 
the first time in 25 years) and trigger formal regulatory reviews.” These reviews led to increased 
scrutiny of utilities’ capital expenditures, and in particular, investments in nuclear plants. 
Then in March 1979, one of the reactors at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania 
suffered a partial core meltdown. Although not a single person was injured, the accident 
intensified public concerns about nuclear safety. The combination of severe public concern about 
the risk of nuclear accidents and escalating construction costs put nuclear projects in an 
extremely vulnerable position. By the time the Chernobyl disaster occurred in April 1986 the 
industry was already moribund. Today in the United States, there are a total of 104 nuclear power 
reactors at 65 sites, accounting for 20% of U.S. electricity generation.
2 All of these reactors were 
ordered prior to 1974.  
Nuclear reactor construction outside the United States followed a similar pattern with a 
substantial boom in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a long period of decline (see Figure 2). In 
addition to the United States, the other large-scale early adopters of nuclear power were the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan. By the 1990s, construction had moved 
                                                           
2  According to U.S. Department of Energy, 2011a, Table 8.2a, U.S. net generation of electricity in 2010 included 
coal (45 percent), natural gas (24 percent), nuclear (20 percent), hydroelectric power (7 percent), and wind and other 
renewables (4 percent). Davis and Wolfram (2011) examine in detail operating performance at U.S. nuclear plants. 4 
 
to Eastern Europe and in particular, Russia and the Ukraine. The increase in construction 2008-
2010 comes primarily from China, which today has more reactors under construction than any 
other country. 
 
Historical Construction Costs 
Nuclear power plants are characterized by high construction costs and relatively low 
operating costs. Later in the paper, I present estimates of “levelized costs” which facilitate 
comparisons with other generating technologies with different cost profiles. It is worth starting 
with construction costs, however, because they represent a large share of the total cost of nuclear 
power.  
Nuclear power plants are enormous facilities with high construction costs. The sheer scale 
of commercial-sized nuclear reactors means that most components must be specially designed and 
constructed, often with few potential suppliers worldwide. These components are then assembled 
on site and structures are constructed to house the assembled components. All stages of design, 
construction, assembly, and testing require highly-skilled, highly-specialized engineers and 
differences in reactor design and site-specific factors have historically meant that there was little 
scope for spreading design and production costs across multiple projects. 
Figure 3 plots “overnight” construction costs for selected U.S. nuclear reactors from U.S. 
DOE (1986). The overnight cost is the hypothetical cost of a plant if it could be built 
instantly, and thus excludes financing and other costs incurred during plant construction. Costs 
are reported in year 2010 dollars per kilowatt of capacity. The figure reveals a pronounced increase 
in construction costs, particularly for plants completed during the 1980s.
3  
Plants also kept taking longer and longer to build. As shown in Table 1, reactors ordered 
during the 1950s took on average about 5 years to build, whereas reactors ordered during the 
1970s took on average 14 years. Most studies attribute this increase in construction time to a 
                                                           
3 The figure includes predicted costs from the same source for a handful of reactors that were under construction but 
not yet in operation in 1986. See Koomey and Hultman (2007) for a more recent study of U.S. nuclear construction 
costs, and Mooz, 1978, Komanoff, 1981, and Zimmerman, 1982 for related studies. Joskow and Rose (1985) 
examine increases in construction costs for coal plants during the same period finding significant cost increases 
associated with measurable environmental-related technologies such as scrubbers and cooling towers, as well as a large 
increase in residual real costs that they attribute to changes in environmental regulation and to an unexplained decline 
in construction productivity. 5 
 
rapidly evolving regulatory process. A joke in the industry was that a reactor vessel could not be 
shipped until the total weight of all required paperwork had equaled the weight of the reactor 
vessel itself. Regulation also contributed directly to construction costs. The NRC implemented 
revised safety codes and inspection requirements leading in several cases to extensive reactor 
redesigns (Cox and Gilbert, 1991; McCallion, 1995). 
An interesting point of comparison is France. After the United States, France has more 
nuclear reactors than any other country and 75% of electricity generation in France comes from 
nuclear power. Grubler (2010) finds that the 58 reactors constructed in France’s main nuclear 
program were constructed at an average cost that increased over time from $1,000 per kilowatt in 
the 1970s, to $2,300 per kilowatt in the 1990s. The cost escalation is less severe than is observed 
in the United States, but still somewhat surprising. As I discuss later, in many ways the French 
nuclear program was the ideal setting for encouraging learning-by-doing, so one might have 
expected costs to decrease over time. 
 
Financing Risks 
The long period of time required for construction means that the cost of capital is a critical 
parameter for evaluating the viability of nuclear power. Even for a low cost of capital, the 
extended construction period imposes financing costs that are a substantial part of total project 
costs. However, nuclear projects typically face a cost of capital well above the risk-free rate. 
These are large-scale projects with a historically high risk of default and the high cost of capital 
reflects the fact that there are a number of sources of risk that threaten the profitability, and even 
viability, of a nuclear project.  
More so than in most other investments, nuclear power plants face substantial regulatory 
risk. The NRC has recently adopted several new procedures intended to streamline the regulatory 
process. These reforms include pre-approving standard reactor designs, an early site permitting 
process, and combining construction and operating licenses which previously were applied for 
separately. It remains to be seen how these procedures will work in practice. Regulatory approval 
is also required at the state and local level and there is precedent for this being a real constraint 
on plants. For example, in 1989 New York Governor Mario Cuomo and the Long Island 
Lighting Company closed the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant over long-standing concerns about 6 
 
how nearby residents would be evacuated in the event of an emergency. The plant was 100 percent 
completed and had been connected to the grid, yet was never used to produce a single kilowatt hour 
of commercial electricity. 
Nuclear power is also sensitive to federal energy policy. The enthusiasm for nuclear power 
in 2007 and 2008 was driven in part by the prospect of a federal cap on carbon emissions, and so 
when the key legislative vehicle (H.R. 2454, the “Waxman Markey bill”) stalled in the Senate in 
2009, it was a significant blow to the economic viability of new nuclear plants. In the last few 
years, the Obama administration and some members of Congress have voiced support for a federal 
“clean energy standard” under which a proportion of total electricity generation would be required 
to come from sources that do not generate carbon emissions. Such a policy could be a considerable 
boost for nuclear power, but the exact form of such legislation or the likelihood as to whether it 
would be adopted is unclear. 
Investors in nuclear power also face the risk that fossil fuel prices could decrease. In the 
United States, natural gas prices typically determine the marginal cost of electricity, so a decrease 
in natural gas prices reduces profits for nuclear plants who sell power in wholesale electricity 
markets. Global availability of natural gas has increased dramatically in recent years with 
improvements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology. Natural gas producers 
have long known that shale and other rock deposits contain large amounts of natural gas. It was 
not until recently, however, that these resources could be accessed at reasonably low cost. 
Figure 4 plots U.S. natural gas prices 1990-2011 and a price forecast through 2030. During 
the long period of relatively low natural gas prices there was not a single new nuclear plant 
ordered in the United States, and the surge in orders in 2007 and 2008 came at the same time 
that U.S. natural gas prices reached their highest level ever in real terms. The baseline forecast 
from Department of Energy (2011b) predicts that U.S. natural gas prices will remain under $5 
through 2022. If true, this is a significant challenge for nuclear power. 
Finally, investments in nuclear power face considerable technology risk. Over the 40-plus 
year lifetime of a nuclear plant, the available sources of electricity generation could change 
considerably. An alternative, lower-cost technology could come along, perhaps a technology that is 
known today such as wind or solar that quickly becomes more cost-effective. An alternative 
technology for carbon abatement could become practical, like some form of carbon capture and 7 
 
storage, which would render moot one of the advantages of nuclear power. New energy 
efficiency technologies might reduce electricity demand. 
 
Recent International Experience 
More recent evidence on construction costs comes from nuclear reactors currently being built 
in Olkiluoto, Finland and Flamanville, France. Much has been written about these reactors because 
they are the first new reactors to be built in Europe in many years, and because they use a “next 
generation” design which incorporates several new safety features into a reactor design that is 
widely used around the world. Construction in Finland began in 2005 and was expected to be 
completed in 2009 at cost of about $2,800 per kilowatt. A series of problems and delays 
have now pushed operations back to 2013, and costs are now estimated to be about twice the 
original estimate. Similarly, construction in France began in 2007 and the reactor was expected 
to be completed by 2011 at a cost of $2,900 per kilowatt. Completion has now been pushed 
back to 2014 and the project is reported to be 50 percent over budget.  
These experiences provide a reminder about problems that can occur during reactor 
construction, particularly given the lack of recent construction experience. Both projects were 
delayed substantially when federal safety inspectors found problems. In Finland, the concrete 
foundation of the reactor building was found to be too porous. In France, inspectors found cracks 
in the concrete foundation and steel reinforcements in the wrong places. Project managers have 
been blamed in both projects for hiring inexperienced contractors and for providing insufficient 
oversight.  
Construction costs have tended to be lower elsewhere. Du and Parsons (2009) report a mean 
overnight cost of $3,100 per kilowatt from five reactors completed in Korea and Japan between 
2004 and 2006. Construction costs from plants recently completed in China are reported to be 
even lower and an important area for future research is to examine these costs in detail. 
Several studies have attempted to synthesize this recent international construction 
experience with historical U.S. data and engineering studies to estimate current construction 
costs for the United States. Table 2 reports estimates of overnight construction cost from two 
such studies. MIT (2009) estimates $4,200 per kilowatt of capacity for nuclear, compared to 8 
 
$2,400 and $900 per kilowatt of capacity for coal and natural gas. U.S. Department of Energy 
(2010) predicts somewhat higher costs particularly for nuclear plants, citing increased prices for 
plant components and key commodities and arguing that costs will be driven up by the fact that 
there is a limited set of construction firms with the ability to complete a project of this scale. 
Both studies were completed prior to Fukushima and thus do not incorporate any cost increases 
due to recent elevated regulatory scrutiny. 
Adding financing costs to these estimates implies that a typical two-reactor 2,000 megawatt 
plant could cost more than $12 billion. This is probably not unreasonable. The long period of 
time since nuclear power plants were constructed in the United States means that the relevant 
experience that had been accumulated by companies involved with nuclear engineering and plant 
construction has atrophied substantially (Joskow and Parsons, 2009). There is some scope for 
importing nuclear engineers and other professionals who have worked on more recent nuclear 
projects in other countries, but the overall level of nuclear construction activity worldwide over 
the last 20 years has been so low that there is a limited amount of available global talent. 
Moreover, the supply of nuclear plant components is now more limited than it was during the 
first wave of nuclear power plant construction. For example, there is currently only one facility 
in the world that can produce the nuclear-grade heavy-steel reactor vessel needed for a boiling 
water reactor and there is currently a long waiting period for these forgings and for other key 
nuclear components (Ives, McCabe and Gilmartin, 2010). 
There is a great deal of uncertainty about these construction cost estimates. This 
uncertainty is itself a barrier to investment. Pindyck (1993) uses a model of irreversible 
investment to illustrate how uncertainty over the prices of construction inputs and over 
government regulation affecting construction costs can lead investors to delay investment on 
nuclear projects. One of the economic arguments made in support of the subsidies for new 
nuclear plants in the 2005 Energy Policy Act was that they would help resolve this uncertainty 
about construction costs. 
 
Levelized Cost Estimates 
The total cost of producing electricity depends both on construction costs and on operations 
and maintenance expenditures, including fuel. These variable costs tend to be low for nuclear, 9 
 
potentially offsetting the higher cost of construction. Table 3 reports “levelized” costs for 
electricity generated in the United States from nuclear, coal, and natural gas, the three primary 
forms of baseload electricity generation. These estimates are based on a cash flow model 
developed in an ongoing series of studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, 
2003; MIT, 2009; Joskow, 2006; Du and Parsons, 2009; Joskow and Parsons, 2009). For these 
estimates all costs including construction, operation, maintenance and fuel are calculated and 
discounted back to the present using an assumed cost of capital. This total cost is then 
“levelized” over the lifetime of a plant in constant dollars to yield the long-run average cost of 
producing a kilowatt hour of electricity. This is equivalent to the real price per kilowatt hour that 
the plant would need to receive over its lifetime in order to break even.  
Under the baseline assumptions nuclear is not competitive with either coal or natural gas. 
The first row reports the base case estimates reported in MIT (2009). The levelized cost of 
nuclear power is 8.7 cents per kilowatt hour, compared to 6.5 cents for coal, and 6.7 cents for 
natural gas. This gap widens in the second row after updating these estimates to reflect higher 
construction cost estimates from U.S. DOE (2010). The third row updates the estimates to reflect 
changes in fuel prices since 2009. Uranium prices have increased modestly, but fuel expenditures 
represent a relatively small proportion of the total cost of nuclear power and at this higher price 
even after including costs for conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication, nuclear fuel costs are 
still less than one cent per kilowatt hour. Moreover, the medium to long-run supply of uranium is 
highly elastic, with substantial known reserves worldwide with a cost of recovery below current 
uranium prices (MIT, 2003, Appendix 5.E; OECD 2009). Fossil fuel prices are extremely 
important for the prospects for nuclear power and the cost estimates in third row reflect somewhat 
higher coal prices but also considerably lower natural gas prices. With these updated prices the 
levelized cost of electricity from natural gas is just above 5 cents per kilowatt hour, compared to 
more than 10 cents per kilowatt hour for nuclear. 
These estimates follow the MIT studies in applying a somewhat higher cost of capital to 
nuclear power. As discussed earlier, this reflects the high risk of default and numerous forms of 
risk faced with nuclear projects. It is worth noting, however, that even without this risk premium 
nuclear still has higher levelized cost than coal or natural gas. The model also assumes a 40-year 
lifetime for nuclear, coal, and natural gas plants. Over half of U.S. nuclear plants have received 
license extensions to 60 years. Incorporating a longer lifetime into the model makes nuclear look 10 
 
better, but not by very much. The increased net revenue is far in the future so with discounting 
there is only a modest decrease in levelized costs. Moreover, coal and natural gas plants are also 
tending to be used for more than 40 years and one would want to incorporate those longer 
lifetimes as well. 
It is important to emphasize that these levelized cost estimates depend on a series of 
assumptions, many of which can be only partially verified empirically. Perhaps most 
importantly, alternative assumptions about nuclear construction costs or natural gas prices can 
begin to change the outlook considerably. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that these cost 
estimates are for the United States and may not easily generalize to other countries. Construction 
costs vary substantially across countries due to differences in the cost of labor and other inputs, 
as well as differences in the regulatory environment. Another key factor is the availability of 
natural gas. Global capacity to transport liquefied natural gas is increasing rapidly, but still 
insufficient to have eliminated price differences across countries.   
 
Incorporating Externalities 
Levelized cost estimates are typically designed to reflect the private costs of investing in 
different forms of electricity generation. Thus they provide a basis for determining whether 
different types of plants will be built, but not necessarily for determining whether different types 
of plants should be built.  
The fourth row in Table 3 incorporates a tax of $25 per ton of carbon dioxide. As a point of 
comparison, the Federal Interagency Working Group (2010) adopts a central social cost of 
carbon dioxide of $22 for 2015. Under this scenario, nuclear continues to have the highest 
levelized cost. The levelized cost of coal increases by 2 cents per kilowatt hour, but the levelized 
cost of natural gas increases by only about 1 cent, not nearly enough to close the gap between 
nuclear and natural gas. Moreover, this static comparison based on current fuel prices ignores 
that coal and natural gas prices would likely fall in response to a carbon tax. For both coal and 
natural gas there is a range of different sources available, much of which with a marginal cost of 
extraction below current prices. 
Fossil fuel plants also emit large amounts of local and regional pollutants. Muller, 11 
 
Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus (2011) calculate that the external costs from sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulates average 3.5 cents per kilowatt hour for coal, but only 0.1 cents per 
kilowatt hour for natural gas. Thus incorporating the external costs of these pollutants improves 
the prospects considerably for nuclear power versus coal, but does little to close the gap versus 
natural gas. A comprehensive welfare analysis would also incorporate the negative production 
externalities from coal and natural gas. Perhaps most importantly, recent increases in shale gas 
production have raised environmental concerns about water consumption and contamination of 
drinking water. These costs are still poorly understood. However, the levelized cost estimates 
give some sense about how large these externalities would need to be in order to make nuclear 
power the low cost option. 
There are also external costs associated with nuclear power. Included in these levelized 
cost estimates is a spent fuel waste fee of 0.1 cents per kilowatt hour. Since 1983 the Department 
of Energy has collected this fee from U.S. nuclear reactors, intended eventually to finance a 
centralized storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. Currently, most spent nuclear fuel is stored 
onsite in spent fuel pools and dry casks. A comprehensive welfare analysis would need to 
include both the private and external costs of this on-site storage. See MIT (2010) and NRC 
(2011) for details about the nuclear fuel cycle.  
Considerably harder to quantify are the risks from nuclear accidents. Since 1957 the Price-
Anderson Act has indemnified U.S. nuclear plant operators from accident liability above a 
certain cap, currently $12 billion. A Fukushima-type accident in the United States could easily 
cause damages well above this cap. It is too early to measure the long-term external costs of 
Fukushima, but an early study estimates that radioactive contamination could cause 1,000 total 
cancer deaths (Hippel 2011). As a point of comparison, cancer deaths from Chernobyl are 
estimated to be approximately 14,000 (Cardis, et al 2006). In addition to cancer deaths, one 
would want to incorporate the costs from other health outcomes, as well as the pecuniary and 
psychological costs associated with relocating people living near the accident site.  
Perhaps hardest of all to measure are the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. This could come through the misuse of nuclear facilities to produce weapons materials, 
or from a “dirty bomb” in which stolen radioactive materials from any source are dispersed using 
conventional explosives. These risks are particularly acute in countries like France, the United 12 
 
Kingdom, and Japan that have facilities for reprocessing nuclear waste. See MIT (2003) and MIT 
(2010) for a discussion of these issues. 
Incorporating the external costs of nuclear power would further increase the gap between 
the levelized costs of nuclear and natural gas. An important priority for future work is to refine 
measures of these external costs and incorporate them explicitly into levelized cost analyses. 
However, given current market conditions in the United States, it becomes difficult to make an 
economic argument for nuclear power regardless of the exact magnitude of these external costs. 
The first challenge continues to be construction costs, which are high enough that nuclear power 
struggles to compete with natural gas even if one ignores these external costs completely.  
 
Learning-By-Doing 
What would it take to reduce nuclear construction costs? One argument is learning-by-
doing. In 2004 the President of the Nuclear Energy Institute testified in front of the Senate that 
nuclear construction costs would decrease by 20-30% after the first few plants (Nuclear Energy 
Institute, 2004). In part on the basis of this testimony, the 2005 Energy Policy Act was drafted to 
include loan guarantees, production tax credits and other subsidies for new nuclear plants. If 
learning-by-doing could push construction costs down this could indeed change the equation 
considerably for nuclear power. A substantial literature in economics indicates that learning-by-
doing matters in a variety of markets (Alchian, 1963; Joskow and Rose, 1985; Irwin and Klenow, 
1994; Benkard,  2000; Thornton and Thompson, 2001; Kellogg, forthcoming), and several studies 
have examined learning-by-doing in the construction of nuclear power plants. 
Recall that the time pattern of construction costs in Figure 3 did not provide any immediate 
evidence of learning-by-doing. Instead, construction costs tended to increase considerably over 
time. Several studies have nonetheless attempted to disentangle learning-by-doing from industry-
wide factors that were changing over time. Using data from the early nuclear builds, both Mooz 
(1978) and Komanoff (1981) find evidence of modest amounts of learning-by-doing in nuclear plant 
construction that accrue to the construction company in charge of the project, but no evidence of 
industry-wide learning-by-doing. Zimmerman (1982) also finds learning-by-doing for the 
construction company and some evidence of spillovers across companies. Using a longer panel, 
McCabe (1996) finds evidence of learning-by-doing for both the construction company and the 13 
 
utility managing the project, but does not test for industry-wide learning. 
Regardless of whether or not it is privately captured, learning-by-doing is important for the 
prospects of nuclear power because it provides a plausible mechanism by which nuclear 
construction costs could decrease below the levels reported in Table 2. Who captures the learning-
by-doing is important, however, for government policy. The economic argument for an industry-
specific subsidy hinges on there being learning-by-doing that is not captured by individual 
companies. If learning is fully appropriable, then firms face efficient incentives for investment and 
no government intervention is necessary. In addition, while there is almost certainly some 
industry-wide learning-by-doing in nuclear, there is also likely to be learning-by-doing in 
emerging forms technologies such as wind, solar, and biomass. When there are a number of 
competing alternatives as there are in electricity generation, many economists favor broad-based 
subsidies that do not single out individual technologies (Schmalensee, 1980). 
Tied up in this discussion is a key tradeoff between innovation and standardization. On the 
one hand, it is important to continue allowing for new and better reactor designs with enhanced 
features for reliability and safety. On the other hand, frequent redesigns make it harder to spread 
engineering costs across projects. The first wave of U.S. reactors were manufactured by four 
different companies—Westinghouse, General Electric, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & 
Wilcox—each with several different designs. At the time, these differences were inevitable. 
The United States led the way in the development of commercial nuclear reactors and the 
technology was evolving rapidly. Still, this diversity of designs provides a possible explanation 
for the lack of immediate evidence of learning-by-doing (Lester and McCabe, 1993). 
France is an important point of comparison. Development of nuclear power in France 
began later and with much less design variation. When Electricité de France began seriously 
building reactors in the 1970s it adopted a single design for all of its reactors. With one exception, 
all nuclear power reactors currently in operation in France are of exactly this same design (IAEC, 
2011). In addition, Electricité de France has long enjoyed a high degree of regulatory stability 
due to its close relationship with the French National Safety Authority and broad public support 
for nuclear power. Given this high degree of standardization, the apparent cost escalation in 
French construction costs is particularly striking. 
Nonetheless, some within the nuclear industry claim that the U.S. is headed more toward 14 
 
the French model. For example, Michael Wallace, chairman of a major nuclear power company 
predicted a couple of years ago (as quoted in Kanter, 2009) that new reactors would be 
standardized down to “the carpeting and wallpaper.”
  Perhaps the industry will quickly coalesce 
around a very small number of reactor designs, but this is not obvious based on applications 
received to date by the NRC. Among the 17 applications that have been received, there is a mix 
of both pressurized water reactors and boiling water reactors, manufactured by five different 
reactor manufacturers (Areva, Westinghouse, Mitsubishi, GE-Hitachi, and GE). At a minimum, it 
seems clear that the French approach of supporting a single reactor design is not going to be 
adopted in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
Nuclear power continues to generate enthusiasm based on its potential to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. A single pound of reactor-grade uranium oxide produces as much electricity as over 
16,000 pounds of coal – enough to meet the needs of the average U.S. household for more than a 
year.
4 And, while burning 16,000 pounds of this coal generates thousands of pounds of carbon 
dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides – nuclear power is virtually emissions free. 
Nuclear power, however, is not without challenges. Fukushima has brought to the forefront 
ongoing concerns about nuclear accidents and the handling and storage of spent fuel. These 
external costs are in addition to substantial private costs. In 1942 with a shoestring budget in an 
abandoned squash court at the University of Chicago, Enrico Fermi demonstrated that electricity 
could be generated using a self-sustaining nuclear reaction. Seventy years later the industry is still 
trying to demonstrate how this can be scaled up cheaply enough to compete with coal and natural 
gas. 
 
                                                           
4 This is my own back-of-the-envelope calculation based on U.S. Department of Energy (2011a), Table 8.2a “Electricity 
Net Generation”, Table 8.5a “Consumption of Combustible Fuels”, Table 8.9 “Electricity End Use”, Table 9.3 
“Uranium Overview”, and Table 12.7b “Emissions from Energy Consumption for Electricity Generation.” 15 
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Figure 2: Nuclear Reactors under Construction Worldwide 
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Source: Author's tabulation based on U.S. Department of Energy (1986), Table 4.
 
 
Figure 4: U.S. Natural Gas Prices and Applications to the U.S. NRC 
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Table 1: U.S. Nuclear Reactor Orders and Construction Time 
        
      Construction Time (In Years) 
      For Completed Reactors 







Completed Average Minimum Maximum 
       
1950s 6 100% 4.5  3  7 
1960s 88  89%  8.6  3  22 
1970s 155  25%  14.1  8  26 
       
Source: Author’s tabulations based on U.S. Department of Energy (1997). 
Construction time is calculated as the difference in years between when a reactor 















Table 2: Construction Costs Excluding Financing 
      
 
Cost Per Kilowatt of Capacity 
 (in year 2010 dollars) 
      
Source Nuclear  Coal  Natural  Gas 
      
MIT (2009)  4200  2400  900 
      
U.S. DOE (2010)  5300  2800  1000 








Table 3: Levelized Cost Comparison 
     
  Levelized Cost in Cents per kWh 
      
Source Nuclear  Coal  Natural  Gas
      
MIT (2009) Baseline  8.7  6.5  6.7 
      
Updated Construction Costs  10.4  7.0  6.9 
      
Updated Construction Costs and Fuel Prices  10.5  7.4  5.2 
      
Carbon Tax of $25 Per Ton CO2 10.5  9.6  6.2 
      
      
Note: These calculations follow MIT (2009) except where indicated in the row headings. All costs are reported 
in 2010 cents per kilowatt hour. Row (1) reports the base case estimates reported in MIT (2009), Table 1. The 
cost estimates reported in row (2) incorporate updated construction cost estimates from U.S. DOE (2010). Row 
(3), in addition, updates fuel prices to reflect the most recent available prices for uranium, coal and natural gas 
reported in U.S. DOE (2011a). Finally, row (4) continues to incorporate updated construction costs and fuel 
prices and, in addition, adds a carbon tax of $25 per ton of carbon dioxide. 
 
 